Presentations and papers

Thanks to Mark and Stefan for their presentations!

I remind you that the papers are due next Monday, 4th of February, and that 10% of the grade for the whole course is based on your contribution to this blog.

Yet another change: more on correlated equilibria

The questions around correlated equilibrium deserve more scrutiny than what I have presented last week. In tomorrow's lecture I will come back to them instead of moving on to team reasoning. The schedule for the last two meetings will thus look like this:

4. Tuesday January 22nd. 11.30-13.30.
   More on correlated equilibrium.
   
   • The Common Prior assumption: the probabilistic and the relational cases, examples, and discussion/motivations.
     
   • Aumann's theorem(s) : '87 and '05. Examples and discussion.
     
     
5. Monday January 28th. 11.30-13.30
   
   • Presentations.
     For the presentations, your are expected to give a 10 to 15 min talk on either your survey paper or your personal contribution. If you have doubts or would need more references on the topic please contact me by email.
   • If time permits, I will say a few words about team reasoning.
     
   
   

I will post the notes about correlated equilibrium after tomorrow's lecture.

10% for blogging

As I mentioned during the lecture, 10% of the grade will go to your participation on this blog. To get these points you have to post 2 questions related to one of the course note, and answer 2 questions from someone else. These are participation points, you will not be evaluated on the content. But note that the blog is moderated: I will simply not authorize questions or answers if they are totally off-topic.

Registration

It seems possible to officially register to the project via Studieweb. If for whatever reason it does not work for you, just come to the first meeting. We will take care of the official registration later.

General Description

This course will examine a number of the important foundational debates in Game Theory, and the possibility for logic, especially (dynamic) epistemic logic, to contribute to these. We will, more precisely, investigate the following issues:

• The role of mutual expectations in strategic reasoning.
• The place of individual vs. group or team reasoning in coordination.
  
• The role of correlated beliefs, focal points and emotions in reciprocation games or prisoner's dilemmas.
  

The course will be for the most part self-contained. The necessary logics along with the important game-theoretic results and concepts will be introduced. Some previous exposure to modal logic and to the basis of game theory (strategic games, Nash equilibrium and other solutions concepts) is, however, preferable. In case of doubts please contact me by email.

Assessment

Each participant will have to hand in two short papers, maximum 7 pages, by February 4. One of them is expected to be a survey paper, covering a logical or a game-theoretical "solution" to one of the debates presented in class. The other should be more a personal contribution to one of these debates.