Bibliography

1. Mutual expectations in strategic interaction.
   General introduction to game theory. Both books are available at the UvA library.
   
   • R.B. Myerson. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Harvard University Press, 1997 edition, 1991. See especially chapters 2 and 3.
   • M.J. Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, 1994. See chapter 2 and 6 for the formal definitions.
     
Epistemic logic and epistemic models for games.

• R.J. Aumann. Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge. International Journal of Game Theory, 28:263–300, 1999.
• J. van Benthem. Rational dynamic and epistemic logic in games. In S. Vannucci, editor, Logic, Game Theory and Social Choice III, pages 19–23. University of Siena, department of political economy, 2003. An updated version of this paper is available.
• G. Bonanno. Two lectures on the epistemic foundations of game theory. Delivered at the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), February 8, 2007.
  
• A. Brandenburger. The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology. International Journal of Game Theory, 35:465–492, 2007.
• R.J. Aumann. When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? with J. H. Dreze (March 2005, no. 387).
2. Epistemic characterizations of rational behavior.
   Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies:
   
   • The references on epistemic models for games.
   • K.R. Apt. The many faces of rationalizability. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 7(1), 2007. Article 18.
3. Coordination and team reasoning.
   • R. Sugden. The logic of team reasoning. Philosophical Explanations 6, pages 165–181, 2003.
   • M. Bacharach. Interactive Team Reasoning: a Contribution to the Theory of Cooperation. Research in Economics 23, 117-147, 1999
   • M. Bacharach. Beyond Individual Choices: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2006. Edited by N. Gold and R. Sugden. (not available at the UvA library. Contact me for more information.)
4. Reciprocation, correlated beliefs and forward induction.
   
   • R.J. Aumann. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality. Econometrica, 55(1-18), 1987.
     
   • Myerson (above), Sections 4.9 and 6.2