Schedule

There will be four lectures, and one session for presentations.

1. Wednesday January 9th. 11.30-13.30.
   Mutual expectations in strategic interaction.
   
   • General introduction to games in strategic forms.
     
   • The "problem" of mutual expectations.
   • Epistemic models for games.


2. Monday January 14th. 11.30-13.30.
   Epistemic characterizations of rational behavior.
   
   • Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, common knowledge of rationality and iterated announcement of rationality.
   • Nash equilibrium, rationality, mutual knowledge of actions and announcement of actions.
     
3. Friday January 18th. 11.30-13.30.
   Reciprocation, correlated beliefs and forward induction.
   
   • Correlated beliefs in strategic games.
   • Forward induction in extensive games.
4. Tuesday January 22nd. 11.30-13.30.
   More on correlated equilibrium.
   
   • The Common Prior assumption: the probabilistic and the relational cases, examples, and discussion/motivations.
     
   • Aumann's theorem(s) : '87 and '05. Examples and discussion.
     
5. Monday January 28th. 11.30-13.30
   
   • Presentations.
     For the presentations, your are expected to give a 10 to 15 min talk on either your survey paper or your personal contribution. If you have doubts or would need more references on the topic please contact me by email.
   • If time permits, I will say a few words about team reasoning.