Thursday, November 22, 2007


There will be four lectures, and one session for presentations.

  1. Wednesday January 9th. 11.30-13.30.
    Mutual expectations in strategic interaction.
    • General introduction to games in strategic forms.
    • The "problem" of mutual expectations.
    • Epistemic models for games.

  2. Monday January 14th. 11.30-13.30.
    Epistemic characterizations of rational behavior.
    • Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies, common knowledge of rationality and iterated announcement of rationality.
    • Nash equilibrium, rationality, mutual knowledge of actions and announcement of actions.
  3. Friday January 18th. 11.30-13.30.
    Reciprocation, correlated beliefs and forward induction.
    • Correlated beliefs in strategic games.
    • Forward induction in extensive games.
  4. Tuesday January 22nd. 11.30-13.30.
    More on correlated equilibrium
    • The Common Prior assumption: the probabilistic and the relational cases, examples, and discussion/motivations.
    • Aumann's theorem(s) : '87 and '05. Examples and discussion.
  5. Monday January 28th. 11.30-13.30
    • Presentations.
      For the presentations, your are expected to give a 10 to 15 min talk on either your survey paper or your personal contribution. If you have doubts or would need more references on the topic please contact me by email.
    • If time permits, I will say a few words about team reasoning.


Stephan202 said...

I assume ``January 17th'' should be ``January 18th''; otherwise I missed a lecture today :)

Olivier Roy said...